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“REGULATORY CAPTURE”: SOURCES AND SOLUTIONS 
Scott Hempling∗ 
. . . [T]he Commission has claimed to be the representative of the 
public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an umpire 
blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; 
the right of the public must receive active and affirmative protection 
at the hands of the Commission.1 
* * * 
As an advisor, practitioner, and expert witness in the field of public utility 
regulation, I have observed policymakers paradoxically concerned that using 
their powers risks losing their powers. Here are two examples. 
“We’ll lose our jobs”: In one state, a major electric utility repeatedly 
resists the agency’s orders by invoking federal preemption, often groundlessly. 
The utility wanted its rights and obligations determined by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (where the state agency was a mere intervenor) rather 
than by the state agency (which had the power to issue and enforce orders). 
Under a proper reading of the federal-state jurisdictional relationship, the state 
agency is parent setting the expectations; while the utility wanted to drag the 
agency to FERC for family counseling. 
In a competitive market, an unresponsive seller loses its customer. A utility 
has a monopoly franchise, but it comes with no lifetime lock. Why not let 
other, more responsive companies compete for the role? Some states have done 
exactly that: Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, and Vermont have transferred the 
traditional utility’s energy efficiency functions to an independent, commission-
regulated entity, selected competitively. The risk of losing a century of steady 
income would jolt any incumbent into responsiveness. 
 
 ∗ Scott Hempling is an advisor to public utility regulatory agencies, and an adjunct professor at 
Georgetown University Law Center, teaching courses on public utility law and regulatory litigation. He is the 
author of REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY PERFORMANCE: THE LAW OF MARKET STRUCTURE, PRICING AND 
JURISDICTION (American Bar Association 2013) and PRESIDE OR LEAD? THE ATTRIBUTES AND ACTIONS OF 
EFFECTIVE REGULATORS (2d ed. 2013). 
 1 Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965) (referring 
to the Federal Power Commission), cert. denied sub nom., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
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But this agency reaction to this possibility was immediately and 
emphatically negative: “If we tried that, we’d all lose our jobs.” Refraining 
from picking the best company for a job for fear of losing your job—that’s 
conceding a lot. And note the asymmetry: When a regulated utility is the entity 
proposing to change the franchisee (such as when it is merging with or being 
acquired by an out-of-state entity), regulatory commissions routinely approve 
the transaction, with no fear of losing their jobs. But when the initiator of 
franchise change is the agency, there is fear of job loss. When the motivation 
for regulatory decision is job-saving rather than public-serving, we have 
“regulatory capture.” 
“They’re captured and there’s no rescue”: Another state suffered from an 
electric utility’s frequent outages. A legislator I know blamed the state 
regulatory commission for failing to set standards and punish shortcomings. I 
suggested he get the commission more support—more staff and expertise, 
better salaries, more political cover for its tougher decisions. A stronger 
commission would have more credibility with which to create a culture of 
performance. That credibility would be even higher if the commission had the 
option of replacing a non-performing utility. 
The legislator objected: “That’s not politically possible. The legislature has 
no stomach for more spending.” Yet the outage had cost state residents, 
according to this legislator, hundreds of millions of dollars in lost business and 
freezer spoilage alone. How was it not “politically possible,” albeit with 
patient, risk-taking leadership, to spend, say, 5 percent of that amount to 
reduce the probability of recurrence by half? It’s all from the same pockets—
customer pockets. Why give ground to the short-term cost-cutters where 
spending saves long-term money? In any event, he added, “It’s useless, they’re 
captured.” Using “capture” as an excuse was itself a form of capture. 
From these two examples, conscientious regulators can define “regulatory 
capture,” recognize its warning signs, and work to resist it. 
A. Definition 
“Regulatory capture” is a ringing phrase, too casually used. But because it 
is a hyperbolic phrase, it is too readily dismissed. With a careful definition, 
regulatory capture can be anticipated, detected, and resisted. 
Regulatory capture does not include illicit acts—financial bribery, threats 
to deny reappointment, promises of a post-regulatory career. These things all 
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have occurred, but they are forms of corruption, not capture. Nor is regulatory 
capture a state of being controlled, where regulators are robots executing 
commands issued by interest groups. 
Regulatory capture is neither corruption nor control. Corruption and control 
are actions of the regulated entity. Regulatory capture is characterized by the 
regulator’s attitude, not the regulated entity’s actions. A regulator is “captured” 
when he is in a constant state of “being persuaded”: persuaded based on a 
persuader’s identity rather than an argument’s merits. Regulatory capture is 
reflected in a surplus of passivity and reactivity, and a deficit of curiosity and 
creativity. It is evidenced by a body of commission decisions or non-
decisions—about resources, procedures, priorities, and policies, where what 
the regulated entity wants has more influence than what the public interest 
requires. The active verb “capture” signals an affirmative effort, to take 
someone captive. But the noun “capture,” and the passive verb form “to be 
captured,” signal a state of being. One can enter that state through one’s own 
actions or inactions. One can allow oneself to be captured. One can assist, and 
sustain, one’s own captivity. 
If regulatory capture is a state of being, assisted and sustained by the 
captive, what roles are played by others? Regulatory capture is enabled by 
those who ignore it, tolerate it, accept it or encourage it: legislators who under-
fund the commission or restrict its authority, presidents and governors who 
appoint commissioners unprepared for the job, human resource officials who 
classify staff jobs and salaries based on decades-old criteria unrelated to 
current needs, intervenors who treat the agency like a supermarket where they 
shop for personal needs, and who treat regulatory proceedings like win-loss 
contests rather than building blocks in a policy edifice. These actions and 
inactions feed a forest where private interest trees grow tall, while the public’s 
needs stay small. 
B. Warning Signs 
If to be “captured” is to be in a constant state of being persuaded, by 
persuader identity rather than merits, what are the warning signs? What are the 
conditions and practices that contribute to and perpetuate regulatory capture? 
No vision, no priorities: In a captured agency, its leaders don’t ask the big 
questions: What products, services and quality standards best serve the public? 
What price levels are necessary, and sufficient, to support those products, 
services, and standards? What market structures will yield the desired results? 
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And within those market structures, what corporate structures and practices 
will induce executives and employees to produce those results? 
Lacking vision and priorities (and a work plan to carry them out), the 
captured agency over-allocates its resources to processing parties’ petitions, 
while under-allocating resources to pursuing the agency’s priorities. This is not 
necessarily the agency’s fault. When legislatures impose statutory deadlines 
for processing parties’ petitioners, while limiting agency funding without 
regard for its obligations, the result is predictable: The agency’s work is 
dominated by what petitioners want rather than by what the public needs. 
An absence of vision leads to deficit of motivation. A captured agency 
lacks a program of continuous self-improvement: a program that has for each 
department, department head, and employee a rigorous plan for professional 
advancement; a program whose resources and momentum are not 
compromised by the commission’s other workload; a program that includes 
regularly recommending legislative changes to strengthen the agency’s ability 
to improve industry performance. 
Issue-framing by the parties: “[D]escription is prescription. If you can get 
people to see the world as you do, you have unwittingly framed every 
subsequent choice.”2 When a regulatory proceeding is initiated by an applicant 
seeking a government benefit, the applicant’s profit motive induces it to frame 
the issues in pecuniary terms; i.e., what I want rather than what the public 
interest requires. Where profit is part of the statutory design, this type of 
positioning is not invalid. But the risk is that the agency fails to reframe the 
case to focus on its public interest mission. 
Private interest framing can induce wrong answers. Robert Frank, a Cornell 
University economics professor, cites a psychology study done in the 1970s. 
The subjects had to spin a wheel, then guess what percentage of African 
countries were members of the United Nations. The subjects assumed the 
wheel was neutral, but it was rigged: For one group of subjects it always 
stopped on 10, for the other group it always stopped on 65. On average, the 
first group guessed that the percentage of African countries in the UN was 25 
percent; the second group guessed 45 percent. The irrelevant wheel influenced 
judgment. The psychologists concluded, in a 1981 paper, that framing a 
decision appropriately is an “ethically significant act.”3 
 
 2 David Brooks, Description is Prescription, N.Y.Times, Nov. 25, 2010 (discussing Leo Tolstoy). 
 3 Robert Frank, The Impact of the Irrelevant, N.Y.Times, May 29, 2010.  
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Drafting and filing an application for a government-granted benefit is an 
exercise in framing—framing a private interest quest (profitability, market 
share maintenance) as a public interest question (viability, reliability, jobs). As 
with the wheel-spinning example, this private interest framing inevitably 
influences regulators’ decisions about what problems and solutions gain their 
attention. 
Framing happens so frequently it is easy to miss, especially within agencies 
that react to others’ priorities instead of setting their own. And framing works 
(for the framer, that is), for three reasons. First, it depends not on deception—
which would be detected and criticized—but on emphasis. No one gets sued 
for framing. Second, every framed proposal has some public interest 
component; e.g., cost recovery shouldn’t lag expenditures, mergers can 
improve efficiencies, new power plants can avoid blackouts. Unlike the 
psychologists’ wheel, the regulated entity’s frame is rarely irrelevant. Third, 
framing rearranges the agency’s priorities, since utility filings tend to trigger 
statutory deadlines while agency-initiated cases do not. 
Procedures that value positions over perspectives: Capture is implicit in 
how agencies organize their proceedings. In captured agencies, litigating 
parties emphasize positions over perspectives. The agency invites and rewards 
this practice by asking “What do you want?” rather than “What do you know?” 
When hearing orders (the initial orders stating the issues to be decided) merely 
restate the parties’ requests, rather than articulate a public interest purpose, that 
is evidence of capture. The commission becomes a commercial interest 
arbitrator at best, a supermarket for private interest shoppers at worst. Policy 
leadership is missing. In the hearing room, the parties ask each other hours of 
questions aimed at their own interests. The commissioners and hearing 
examiners mostly observe, on the mistaken premise that oppositional sparks 
will light up a public interest path. The parties treat the agency staff as a 
mediator for short-term settlements rather than as a transmitter of the 
commission’s vision (a real likelihood if there is no vision, as described 
above). The commission accepts these settlements instead of directing its staff 
to pursue its vision. 
Low professional expectations: In my field of public utilities, the 
regulatory agencies under-appreciate the need for employee credentials. States 
require licenses for pedicurists but not for rate case witnesses; regulatory 
organizations award “certificates” for conference attendance but not for subject 
matter mastery. Regulated utilities, in contrast, regularly require advanced 
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credentials for power plant operators, fiscal officials, executive officers—
anyone whose hand or pen touches operations, finance, or management. 
This difference in credentialing produces, and reinforces, a difference in 
salaries; leading to a difference in motivation and morale; leading, 
unremarkably, to a difference in tenure for the talented. They spend their 
formative years learning on the taxpayer dime, then move to the regulated 
sector. No one with the power to fix the problem notices or reacts. The 
“revolving door” then becomes a one-way door: more agency staff move to 
jobs with the regulated than the other way around. That’s capture. It is neither 
corruption nor conflict of interest; it is simply the natural economic result of 
the agency failing to insist on high-quality professionals and pay them their 
worth. 
External political actions and inactions: The opposite of regulatory 
capture is agency independence. Independence is undermined when interest 
groups take their case to the governor, who then pressures the agency behind 
the scenes. Agencies that have a choice: cave, or remind the governor that her 
influence over sitting commissioners is no greater than any other citizen. The 
wrong choice is evidence of capture. Also contributing to capture is political 
distancing for political convenience: when the commission makes the tough 
calls (e.g., utility service cannot be below-cost-but-high-quality, or shareholder 
investment cannot be low-risk-but-high-profit), politicians join the protests 
rather than signal support. 
“What’s good for the company is good for the country”: It is common for 
benefit-seekers to describe their private interests in public interest terms. In the 
public utility field, the typical applicant for merger approval cites its need to 
“position itself competitively.” Regulatory agencies sometimes adopt this 
argument as policy, viewing their regulatory duty as supporting the utility’s 
competitive interests. The irony of, and market distortion resulting from, 
issuing government orders to serve a single company’s competitive interest 
goes unnoticed. There is a difference between (a) keeping a well-performing 
utility monopoly financially capable of providing its obligatory service, and (b) 
becoming a volunteer in the utility’s competitive campaigns. When that 
difference disappears, when “bigger is better” becomes the guide for decisions, 
the utility’s goals become the commission’s. That’s capture. 
* * * 
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These warning signs are less the capturing actions of regulated entities, and 
more the capture actions—and inactions—of regulators and their colleagues in 
other government branches. This makes the term “regulatory capture” both 
imprecise and inaccurate. The “captured” commission’s cage is not locked and 
guarded by its enemies; its door is opened and closed by the commission itself. 
C. Sources 
A common contributor to capture is a regulatory agency’s mistaken view 
that its purpose is to “balance” the interests of consumers and investors. This 
understanding of regulation as private interest balancing, so deeply embedded 
in regulatory conversation, practice, and psyche, has five main problems. 
Ambiguity: To claim that one balances interests is to muddle regulation 
with multiple ambiguities. Which consumers—large or small, industrial or 
residential, eastern or western, today’s or tomorrow’s? Which consumer 
interests—low prices or high quality? Which investors—buy-and-hold 
shareholders, pension funds, hedge funds, short sellers, or bondholders? Which 
company interests—this year’s profits or next decade’s viability? What time 
horizon—short-term or long-term? And what do we mean by “balance”? 
Balance implies equivalence—the precise midpoint between two interests of 
equal weight. Are the customer-investor weightings exactly equal? At all 
points in time? Or can they vary from equivalence at any point in time, 
provided the variations balance over some longer period of time? None of 
these questions (important to anyone with a stake in regulation) is answered by 
the phrase “balancing interests.” 
Nearsightedness: If a regulated service were merely a commercial 
transaction affecting only the buyer and seller, then balancing the interests of 
customers and investors would be a logical regulatory mission (provided we 
resolved the many ambiguities just discussed). But regulated services are rarely 
mere bilateral commercial transactions. In the public utility field, regulated 
companies create, operate, and maintain the infrastructure supporting our 
economy; the infrastructure that sustains life and its quality (think water 
shortage, electricity outage, no telephone service, no streetlights, no movies). 
Utility service also produces the multi-millennial residue of today’s production 
and consumption decisions: e.g., nuclear waste and carbon emissions from 
electricity generation, chemical residue from telephone pole treatment, leaks 
from gas pipelines. The regulatory lens must be both wide-angle and long-
distance. Balancing interests misses this point. 
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Presumption of conflict: A balance presumes two weights in opposition. 
But the legitimate aims of consumers and suppliers are not in opposition. 
Viable sellers, satisfied customers, no waste, no free lunch, reasonable prices 
and reasonable returns—these goals are consistent and mutually reinforcing. 
High-quality performance and efficient consumption benefit everyone: 
customers, shareholders, bondholders, workers, and the environment. 
Opposition arises only from illegitimate aims: like the cost-causing 
consumer seeking to shift costs, the shareholder insisting on excess returns. If 
the regulator rejects the illegitimate aims, the assumption of opposites, and the 
perceived need to balance opposing interests, go away. But some regulatory 
fora do the reverse. They embed opposition into procedure, by tolerating 
private interest pleas that have adverse effects on others. They expect, and 
allow, parties to position themselves at the poles, paying no penalty for 
unreasonableness. They encourage these opposing parties to make deals—
”settlements” that favor the better-resourced parties, settlements that then are 
approved by a boxed-in commission. The presumption of conflict embodied in 
the “balancing” perspectives leads to compromises among private interests 
rather than advances of the public interest. 
Passivity: An agency that balances private interests is presiding rather than 
leading. Outcomes are defined, and evaluated, by the parties’ desires, not the 
public’s needs. The forum serves the parties, instead of the parties serving the 
forum. This passivity leaves the public unserved, because the midpoint of two 
private interests is but a third private interest. 
Legal looseness: Regulatory proceedings are legal proceedings, bounded 
by statutes and constitutional law that create rights and obligations. The 
regulatory responsibility is to define the rights and obligations, then protect the 
rights and enforce the obligations. Balancing private interests diverts attention 
from the agency’s legal tasks. (Caveat: The occasional statute does contain a 
balancing-type phrase in its preamble. In that limited context, this legal 
argument has less force. But even in those situations, the interests requiring 
balance are the rights and obligations created by statute (which the agency 
must define), not the self-interests advanced by the parties.) 
The commission-court difference: Regulators who prefer to “balance,” 
who preside rather than lead, liken the regulatory agency to a court and the 
regulator to a judge. Doing so undermines the agency’s effectiveness. An 
agency’s purpose derives from its origins. The legislature receives its 
lawmaking powers from a constitution. The legislature then creates a 
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commission, delegating to it some substantive slice of its lawmaking powers. 
That delegation consists of commands and standards; e.g., establish “just and 
reasonable” rates, ensure “reliable service,” allow mergers if “consistent with 
the public interest.” Common to these commands and standards is a legislative 
purpose: make and carry out policy to promote the public interest. 
That is not what courts do. A court is not a delegatee of the legislature, 
making and carrying out policies to promote the public interest. Courts resolve 
disputes brought by parties, disputes whose boundaries are drawn by the 
parties’ complaints and answers. Agencies and courts do have commonalities. 
Both make decisions that bind parties. Both base decisions on evidentiary 
records created through adversarial truth-testing. Both exercise powers 
bounded by legislative line-drawing. But courts do not seek problems to solve; 
they wait for parties’ complaints. In contrast, an agency’s public interest 
mandate requires it literally to look for trouble. Courts are confined to legal 
violations, but commissions are compelled to advance the public welfare. Even 
the narrowest of commission decisions—say, approving or disapproving a 
special contract between utility and industrial customer—affects a public larger 
than the parties: Will the low contract price shift costs to other customers or 
weaken the utility’s finances? Will the lucky buyer’s competitors seek me-too 
treatment? To what effect? 
Like an agency, a court’s decisions can affect non-parties. A class action 
suit under the civil rights or securities laws, an antitrust suit against a 
Microsoft, can set policy for a generation. But consider this difference: A 
judge’s power to act is still defined by, and confined to, the issues stated in the 
plaintiff’s complaint. For an agency, a petitioner’s filing is stimulation but not 
limitation. The agency can add issues, combine proceedings, invite other 
parties, or convert a two-party complaint into multi-party rulemaking, all as the 
public interest demands. 
Given these differences, a regulator that acts like a judge undermines the 
agency’s effectiveness. He assumes that the parties, their interests, their 
arguments, and their legal citations comprise the full intellectual universe 
requiring regulatory attention. This assumption relies on one or more of the 
following premises, each one wrong: (1) the scatterplot of private interests 
appearing in a proceeding will display some pattern from which the 
commission can discern the public interest; (2) the public interest is 
synonymous with satisfaction of those private interests; (3) the private 
interests’ evidentiary submissions will produce information sufficient in 
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relevance and objectivity to discern the public interest; (4) the opportunity for 
access equals the reality of access (i.e., all possible private interests have 
hearing room resources sufficient to get the commission’s ear); or (5) through 
the static and friction of private interest opposition, a regulatory “truth” will 
emerge. 
Accepting any of these premises undermines effectiveness, by: (1) inducing 
intellectual passivity, because the proceeding and the record become party-
centric rather than public-centric (“What are the parties seeking?” instead of 
“How do I advance the public interest?”); (2) imposing the wrong time horizon 
(the parties’ short-term goals rather than the public’s long-term needs); (3) 
reducing the regulator’s objectivity (because the regulator learns the issues 
from parties’ arguments rather than impartial sources); (4) distorting the 
regulator’s time management, because as the parties load the record with 
conversation among themselves (testimony, cross examination, and briefs), 
procedural law compels the regulator to read every page, leaving insufficient 
time and mental space to read and think on her own; or (5) substituting private 
settlements for public interest solutions (regulation, unlike marital dissolutions 
and fender-benders, requires policymaking, not dispute resolution). 
Yet many regulators prefer the “judicial” mindset, for at least four reasons. 
First, it’s familiar. In regulatory procedure, adjudication holds center stage. We 
use it in the “big cases.” Its formality commands respect. Its familiarity defines 
the forum: because it uses judicial techniques, it is “quasi-judicial.” The prefix 
quasi is the tipoff. There is nothing “quasi” about making policy for the public. 
Adjudication is only a procedural device, used to discern and declare the public 
interest. Second, many regulatory appointees are generalists. Faced with 
regulation’s complexity, the generalist prefers to examine the arguments of the 
more experienced, rather than frame the arguments her own way. The third 
reason is overwork. If one is overrun by paper, it is easier to preside than to 
lead. Fourth, acting like a judge carries less risk; politics punishes errors of 
omission less than errors of commission. 
D. Resistance and Escape 
Attempts at regulatory capture are unavoidable; everyone does it.4 Attempts 
are not avoidable, but capture is not inevitable. If regulatory capture is a state 
 
 4 See Cole Porter, Let’s Do It, Let’s Fall in Love, on The Very Best of Cole Porter (“Birds do it, bees do 
it, even educated fleas do it . . . . Some Argentines without means do it; I hear even Boston beans do it.”). 
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of being persuaded, based on the persuader’s identity rather than a policy’s 
merits, how does an agency resist; or if already captured, escape?5 
As explained, an agency is susceptible to capture when there are (a) policy 
voids instead of vision, (b) priorities and procedures that reflect parties’ 
requests rather than public interest needs, (c) chronic resource differentials 
between the regulator and regulated, and (d) fair-weather politicians whose 
support for regulation sags when pressured by those who would weaken it. 
Successful agencies shrink their susceptibility to capture, using several 
strategies. 
Agency as framer: An applicant may have a legal right to seek a benefit, 
but not a right to frame the case. An alert agency reframes an applicant’s 
private interest request as a public interest question. Looking at products, 
prices, performance, the agency asks: what do customers deserve? Looking at 
market structures and corporate structures, the agency asks: which ones 
produce the best performance? Reframing means the public interest dog wags 
the applicant’s tail, not the other way around. It means organizing each 
proceeding by asking “How do we advance the public interest?” not “What do 
the parties want us to decide?” In major policy areas like performance 
standards, mergers, and rates, agencies focused on framing will create 
substantive policies before adjudicatory proceedings occur. Then the parties’ 
proposals will track commission priorities, not the other way around. Or if the 
relevant policy has not been established, the alert commission will open the 
proceeding with staff papers that frame the issues in objective terms, 
specifying public interest questions that all parties are obligated to address. 
Agency as evaluator of industry performance: Regulation works when it 
links inputs to outputs. The agency must (a) describe a public interest vision, 
measured in results (investment, innovation, prices, quality of service, safety); 
(b) shape internal agency actions (budgeting, staffing, education) to prepare for 
external actions (agency orders aimed at industry performance); (c) take 
external actions (promulgating rules, issuing orders, recommending new 
 
 5 “Captured” can describe both a person and an institution, so the solutions are both personal and 
institutional. This Essay focuses on the institutional solutions. Personal protection requires an armor of 
personal attributes, including purposefulness, education, decisiveness, and independence. See generally SCOTT 
HEMPLING, PRESIDE OR LEAD? THE ATTRIBUTES AND ACTIONS OF EFFECTIVE REGULATORS (2nd ed. 2013) 
(these attributes and others are discussed more fully in chapters one to ten). 
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legislation) to induce utilities and consumers to produce that performance; and 
(d) evaluate and revise.6 
Agency as committed employer: Successful agencies offer their employees 
indispensable roles and opportunities for advancement. They connect 
professional expectations to industry performance, creating a commission 
culture that supports the statutory mission. They insist that each department 
have for each department head and each employee, a work plan that 
emphasizes indispensability, propels workers to achieve, and expects them to 
advance. That work plan must be backed by an education plan that grows 
juniors into seniors. Achievement is reflected in salaries similar to those paid 
by the regulated entities, salaries uncompromised by arbitrary budget caps. 
Developing a corps of professionals, and paying them their worth, is more 
cost-effective than wishing and watching: wishing regulated entities would 
perform better, and watching the best agency employees migrate to private-
sector jobs. 
Resources based on demands rather than politics: When agency resources 
depend on legislative decisions, there is risk of rollbacks based on stakeholder 
dissatisfaction, or arbitrary caps that base budgets on last year’s totals rather 
than next year’s demands. A better combination of budgetary independence 
and fiscal accountability is to allow the agency to fund its own budget, through 
fees on regulated entities. With this authority, the agency can vary the funding 
source with the regulated activity. The fees can reflect case complexity, 
ensuring sufficient resources while assigning costs to the cost-causer. When a 
utility proposes a conglomerate merger lacking any public interest purpose, 
with the agency statutorily obligated to prevent harm, the cost of regulatory 
review belongs with the merging parties, not the taxpayers. For commission-
initiated work, such as industry-wide rulemakings, the revenue source can be 
general fees charged to the regulated based on some combination of revenues, 
profits, and assets, with these fees recoverable through prices, since customers 
are the beneficiaries. 
Caution: Objectors to fee-based agencies worry that the agencies will over-
fund or under-deliver. But until such evidence emerges, the realistic 
assumption is that the risk of over-funding is lower than the risk of under-
regulating. For commissions that spend inefficiently (which is different from 
over-regulating), the solution is not to cut their staff but to help them spend 
 
 6 See PETER DRUCKER, THE EFFECTIVE EXECUTIVE: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO GETTING THE RIGHT 
THINGS DONE (2006). 
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wisely. A regular assist from independent experts in commission management, 
coupled with supportive legislative and executive oversight, should be par for 
all regulatory agencies inside and outside regulation. 
* * * 
My most inspiring encounters have been with regulatory agencies that 
combat capture with quality. To their entire professional staffs, from the thirty-
year veterans to the six-month novices, their leaders deliver this message: “We 
will leverage our statutory authority and our professional ability to bring 
excellence to the industries we regulate, starting with excellence within our 
own organization. We will do this by putting ourselves on a path to self-
improvement so rigorous, so disciplined, so transparent, so determined, and so 
optimistic that we will persuade the utilities, the legislators, and the courts that 
we deserve not only their respect but their deference.” These agencies remain 
works in progress, but their progress is undisputed. 
 
